Friday, December 14, 2012
THE PLATEAU SATE NULGE MIN WAGE STRIKE
Saturday, March 17, 2012
MIDDLE BELT PEOPLE OF NIGERIA: ARISE
“Let me tell you, in the event of the breakup of Nigeria, the north is the component that will remain one and united”. Junaid Mohammed
Good morning class. Today’s lesson is taken from the Book of Karl Marx. It is about rebellion. By the way, how many of you have heard of Karl Marx? His doctrine glamorized rebellion. He had asked workers of the world to unite against tyranny and or exploitation of any kind by the bourgeoisie, as they (workers or proletariats) in the final analysis, have nothing to lose other than their chains.
He sanctimoniously predicted the rise and eventual dictatorship of the worker over the owners of the factors of production. Okay? Workers indeed did rebel and the result was the now moribund Soviet Union and mighty industrial China. Who was the poet philosopher king that coined the adage, “to reign is worth an ambition; better reign in hell than serve in heaven? If you know the answer, keep it to yourself, as no questions shall be entertained throughout the two hours duration expected of a lesson such as this, this Monday morning. Who remembers that guy of yore, who soliloquized, “give me death in one hand and honor in the other and I will look at both indifferently as I love the allure of honor more than I fear death.” Julius Ceaser. Paraphrased.
Now, from what part of the country did we have a powerful soldiering clique that metamorphosed into a dreaded and influential mafia, named Langtang? Which part of Nigeria has the reputation of having produced the greatest numbers of Generals in Nigerian history? And finally, which part of the Nigerian federation has been involved in coup making more than the rest combined? I forgot. One more question class, and we are on our way. Which part of the Nigerian federation has the reputation of being the bread basket of the country priding itself as possessing or sitting atop the largest concentration of solid mineral deposits in Africa?
If you are of age like I am, come let’s reason. If you are of the younger generation Middle Belt Nigerian, get a sheet of paper handy. Because everything we say in this lesson today, will eventually form part of a quiz to assess your grasp of the knowledge of the wasted lives and resources of Middle Belt peoples of Nigeria. We shall also examine the reason why they lag behind the minorities of the South-south, who have since re-asserted their pre-eminence and single-handedly removed the oppressive shackles (of their majority neighboring tribes); we shall discuss the sickening role of Middle Belt minorities as perpetual cannon fodder for the Hausa-Fulani people in their unending struggle to dominate Nigeria. While we do not in any way claim to approximate to the wisdom of the aforementioned peoples nor do we claim a right to speak on their behalf, we must help since it appears no one hears from Dan Agbese anymore. I want to use this sacred podium to call on the people of the Middle Belt of Nigeria to rebel against the tyranny of the Hausa/Fulani or forever remain the most backward and endure accordingly.
People of the Middle Belt, arise; you have nothing to lose other than your chains.
To fully understand, we must take a trip into the not too distant past of Nigeria’s history. Yes we must! Now, you ask: what has become of the dreaded, respected, feared, war-like Middle Belt people of Nigeria? Who caged the giants of the Middle Belt, Nigeria? Where are the scions of Joseph Tarka and Gideon Orkar and Colonel Iyorshe? Should General Maman Vatsa have died in vain? Over some time, these questions and more have agitated the minds of well meaning Nigerians and lovers of democracy and liberation struggles. Essentially of the Nok culture, the Ebira, Jukun, Gwari, Nupe, Tiv, Idoma, Bissom and the clusters of other minority elements in the Middle Belt region dominate the geographical area we are talking about. They were and are still war-like, thoroughly educated, industrious, fiercely nationalistic and predominantly Christian. The crafty British did not lose sight of this. They recognized this so much that in the beginning, it was from this class that the foundation of the infantry (foot soldiers) of the West African Frontier Force and later the Nigeria Army, was formed. It was not any surprise that the Nigeria Civil War was theirs - just for the asking. Class, hope you’re still with me. Theophilus Danjuma, reputed to have killed Aguiyi Ironsi and Adekunle Fajuyi, comes from this group. Buka Suka Dimka who gunned down, Murtala Mohammed came from this stock. Gideon Orkar, the visionary, revolutionist-soldier who if he was Igbo or from any of the majority tribes in Nigeria would have been transformed into a folk-hero, came from thence. He would have been eulogized in folklores and poetry and dramatized to no end, had he come from the Yoruba nation of Nigeria.
Come to think of it, why can’t the guy, Gideon Orkar, be likened to Odumegwu Ojukwu, as a visionary who came before his time? Is it because he is not Igbo or Yoruba? Didn’t he once upon a time, properly, redraw the map of Nigeria to the secret applause of many? General Malu, who distinguished himself as ECOMOG Commander and later had the inglorious reputation of leveling Odi, came from this tribe. David Mark, who right from when he was a Major in the Nigerian Army, supervised the further abandoning of the abandoned property of the Igbo in Port Harcourt, had held responsible and reputable positions in the land. He too comes from this region. I mean David Mark; the current Senate President (was he at Ojukwu’s funeral?). What of Generals Shelleng, Domkat Bali, John Shagaya, Jerry Useni, Joe Garba, Audu Ogbe et al. At a point in time, these people formed the nucleus population of the dreaded Langtang Mafia.
The Langtang Mafia was essentially of the soldiering class which later metamorphosed into a lose confederate of the movers and shakers of policies in Nigeria. More than half of the population of the G34 Group belonged to the mafia. They grandfathered the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). All these men, if they had belonged to a distinct country, collectively would have possessed a cumulative knowledge, education, wealth and experience enough to put that country in the top bracket of the world’s most performing economies. This region was so important and predominant in the makeup of the Nigerian armed forces that when the mantle of leadership hovered during the uncertain days that preceded the murder of Aguiyi Ironsi, it fell on the hands of one of them - Yakubu Gowon. I hate to push General IBB into this column. Strictly speaking, that is where he should belong. But, he is Muslim.
Now, if the aforementioned people all come from Nigeria’s Middle Belt region, and have been at the corridors of power (following Hausa-Fulani up and down like mumu) for as long as God knows, why is it that their area has been some of the least developed in Nigeria second only to the Niger Delta? Why are there no good roads in the Middle Belt area of Nigeria? Why is the road from Keffi in Nasarawa through Makurdi in Benue, a living hell? Why has that road not at least been dualized? Why are there not (except Dangote Cement) any industries of repute in the region? Why are the people’s brands of agriculture not being revolutionized? Why is there runaway unemployment in the Middle Belt zone? Why didn’t the leaders, earlier produced from this region do enough to uplift the quality of lives of its people?
Why are the political wishes and destinies of the people of the Middle Belt (who arguably make at least a quarter of the Nigerian population) still tied to the apron strings of the Hausa/Fulani oligarchs? Why? Why is it that every important political appointment meant for the north always ended up in the kitty of the Hausa/Fulani? Why is it that any important federal investment meant for the north ends up in the belly of the Hausa-Fulani geographical area? And why is it so, that the area belonged to the north only in name? Why doesn’t the Middle Belt area of Nigeria have anything to show for the political support it had shown to the core north? When will the Middle Belt region be liberated? Why is it that the people from the area do not have a voice of their own? Why are there not visible coherent political pressure groups like the Ohaneze, Afenifere, South-South Elders Forum, and or the MASSOB, the OPC, and the BOKO HARAM in the Middle Belt region in spite of the areas’ strategic importance?
NIGERIA AT CROSSROADS: THE POSITION OF THE MIDDLE BELT PROFESSIONALS (MBP)
Introduction
Our country Nigeria is on a time bomb. Incessant crises in the Niger Delta, the Boko Haram crisis, inter group violence across the country, minority factor in Nigerian politics, citizenship challenges, religious intolerance, bad governance at all levels are all shaking our faith in the unity of the country and calling into question our collective future. The situation is exacerbated by the inability of the Federal Government to guarantee security of lives and property. The National Assembly also looks helpless. The Middle Belt Professionals (MBP), a group of technocrats of Middle Belt extraction recently met and reviewed the Nigerian project and unfolding developments.
Though the MBP as a group are committed to the unity of Nigeria and are prepared within reason to do whatever it takes to ensure that unity, we are however, extremely disturbed by the irresponsible and violent way in which different stakeholders in the Nigerian project are expressing their grievances against the State and putting ordinary law abiding Nigerians at risk.
The inability of the Federal Government to decisively contain the escalation of these crises is bringing to the fore, the many contradictions in the national fabric, leading many to doubt whether we can manage our diversity and mutual suspicions well enough to still build a nation state that will ensure our collective destiny. Already other stakeholders are giving subtle notice of their intentions to reconsider the Nigerian project.
The National Question
The MBP as a group is of the opinion that as the Federal Government grapples with the escalating crises and the different ways in which the National Question is being manifested in the country today, transparent attempts must be made to get Nigerians talking in order to decide whether they want to live together or not.
Should we want to live together, as is our prayer and hope, we must ALL commit to a secular state where there will be absolute freedom of worship without any one riding on religion and faith to hold others to ransom. We must also commit to a citizenship status in which the settler indigene divide will be obliterated to allow for every Nigerian to feel at home in every corner of the country he or she may choose to call home. Commitment must also be made to restructure the country to allow for appropriate empowerment of federating units.
Should we decide to abandon the Nigerian project, which will be extremely unfortunate, instead of spilling unnecessary blood, we must be responsible enough to use the Southern Sudan template allowing for stakeholders who want to leave to decide through a referendum.
Clarion Call to Middle Belters
The MBP calls upon all people of Middle Belt extraction and other Nigerian minorities to support the call for a Sovereign National Conference. The country is structurally skewed against the minorities and we must support a forum that will give us an opportunity to renegotiate our Cinderella status in the country, and should others decide that they are done with the Nigerian project, we must be ready to take our destiny in our hands.
Doing this requires acute awareness of the minority factor in Nigerian politics. The Minorities of Nigeria are an entity larger than any of the Southern or Northern regions of Nigeria. They account for about 51% of Nigerians and are indisputable power brokers in Nigeria. The minorities are responsible for Nigerian stability and many of the country’s core values.
Unfortunately, the way they have been scattered across Nigeria and, overrun in some states especially in the North has made it extremely difficult for them to cohere into a very potent political force in the country. The minorities of the south- south are still largely in the shadow of the major groups in the South while many of those in the North have remained in the shadow of the Hausa- Fulani. If the Nigerian project is to survive, the minorities must unite, demand and be given sufficient political space within which to contribute on mutual terms in the project. In states like Gombe, Bauchi, Niger, Adamawa, Kebbi, Kaduna and Zamfara where they have been overrun and virtually chocked by pockets of Hausa- Fulani elements, their liberation must be a condition for our continued existence.
Minorities must go back to history to challenge and interrogate myths and silences propagated and reinforced against them by majority ethnic peoples in the country. In the North for example, they must challenge Hausa-Fulani hegemony and expose the conspiracy between Lord Lugard and the Caliphate to subjugate minority groups through the agency of the Caliphate and Indirect Rule which conspiracy is the foundation of current instability especially in the North.
Northern Minorities must rigorously contest the post Jihad narrative of Northern identity that seeks to conscript them into a monolithic North in which they remain a footstool for the so called ‘true north’ because of their characteristic refusal to pander to the religious orthodoxy of the Caliphate. Northern Minorities must be aware of the potency of the ‘Maguzawa template’ which the Caliphate has used to silence and turn non Muslim Hausa into ignoble minorities in their land and the ongoing attempts to deploy the template effectively against northern minorities by isolating them and undermining their self confidence.
Northern Minorities must realize that ‘Hausa’ in the sense we know and use today is a political and quasi religious derivative from the writings of Othman Danfodio who conceived a political union of the different Hausa States and proceeded to foist a Fulani leadership on the union through arbitrary force and stealth after holding the states as an amalgam of bad Muslims.
Northern Minorities must valorize their history and politically construct their identity to include the marginalized others in the North into a greater Middle Belt comprising minority nationalities as far as Bornu to the North East and Kebbi to the North West.
The MBP reiterate that the basis for our commitment to a one Nigeria can only be assured if all Nigerian nationalities commit to a secular state where freedom of worship is unequivocally guaranteed. This will guide against attempts in parts of the North to foist Islam as a state religion, promote Islamic symbols in public spaces using public funds thereby undermining other ways of worship. Nigerians must accept our diversity and multi religious nature as inviolable.
We must cherish and respect it. We must also commit to a citizenship status obliterating the indigene/settler divide to allow Nigerians call anywhere they maybe living truly home. Incessant flash points across the country arising from binary tensions between so called settlers and indigenes must be resolved in favour of a citizenship that does not privilege primordial sentiments. The current situation in which one can walk into the country from neighbouring Chad or Niger to settle for two or three years in some northern town and becomes more ‘Nigerian’ than others who might have been around for decades is unacceptable . Our commitment to a one Nigeria will also be assured with the restructuring of the federation to allow the federating units to be sufficiently empowered through responsible devolution of powers from the centre. Nigeria cannot be sustained through the sharing of oil revenues without accountability nor attempts to develop other revenue sources including robust tax regimes.
The position of the MBP is that these conditions are the basic minimum for our continued existence. We think our fathers and brothers shed their blood to maintain the unity of this country without carefully thinking through the considerations that would accrue to them. Others who shed less blood have been corruptly feasting on the unity of the country and pauperizing our people. Worse, it is their actions as sponsors of crises, religious intolerance and self centeredness that are pushing us to the brink today. While they may be the first today, even in old age to indicate willingness to fight for a one Nigeria, we will not shed our blood again for this country and such people unless we are convinced that we will be better for it.
The MBP urges Minority states of the country, especially in the North to urgently legislate against indiscriminate grazing of life stock by itinerant Fulani herdsmen in the employment of their patrons in the cities. Their activities are destabilizing and a serious security threat to many parts of the Middle Belt. States should require those who have cows to keep them on farms or ranches. This is global good practice. Such legislation will safeguard the farms of our people, enhance food security, reduce friction and close a destabilization window which Caliphate agency has been using against our communities.
Conclusion
The MBP urge politicians, scholars, professionals and opinion leaders of Middle Belt extraction to close ranks quickly in order to articulate a common position in the Nigerian project and begin to explore strategic alliances with other Nigerian Minorities especially those in Cross River, Akwa Ibom and other parts of the South South.
On our part, we will intensify awareness creation on these and other issues within the greater Middle Belt. We will also continue to champion a Middle Belt identity and the need for a very responsible political recruitment process within and amongst the different nationalities of the Middle Belt. We are open to honest and committed dialogue on the Nigerian Question and urge all stakeholders to come to the table with open minds and clean hands. Anything short of this will not serve the Nigerian Project. We are building a website to help in awareness creation and efficient networking as well as the collation of inputs and ideas that will advance and give voice to our concerns in Nigeria.
Signed:
Kwagher Tartenger, PhD
Convener
15th March, 2012.
Monday, February 6, 2012
Friday, February 3, 2012
Jos: The Window into a Nigerian Civil War
Nigeria's Middle Belt region is where the country's Christian south and Muslim north come to a head. This convergence of religion manifests in the capital Abuja, where the equally represented populations are generally tolerant of one another. In the nearby city of Jos whose societal make up is starkly similar to the capital, religious intolerance is brewing tension to a dangerous boiling point.
Over the last twenty years, Jos has been plagued by sectarian violence which has claimed thousands of lives while displacing many others. In 2010, week-long riots resulted in the death of hundreds of locals and the destruction of churches and mosques alike. This steady campaign of attacks against places of worship has made chances of reconciling these populations a seemingly insurmountable feat. The people of Jos may not yet be cognizant of this fact, but the deteriorating security situation in the rest of Nigeria may have a far more tragic impact in a place with a deeply rooted history of intolerance.
Nigeria's predominantly Muslim north has become increasingly engulfed in a violent campaign by fundamentalist violence. On January 20, Nigeria's second city of Kano was devastated by a wave of bombings by Boko Haram Jihadists against military, police, and government installations, killing upwards of 250 people. Continuous attacks like these, along with a previous Boko Haram warning for all Christians to leave the northern states, have incited nearly 35,000 people to flee southward thus far.
These newly created refugees, who are leaving with such panic and haste that they are not bothering to bring their most valuable of possessions with them, are making way for Jos. Positioned just outside of the Muslim north, Jos provides a convenient safe haven for Christian refugees as they journey towards the friendlier south. As many of those refugees opt to remain in Jos, they threaten to alter the delicate sectarian balance in the city, paving the way for shattering the city's hard-won peace.
Given Jos' recent history of violence, it remains clear that fierce and deadly riots may erupt from even seemingly insignificant altercations. In 2001, the appointment of a Muslim resident as the Local Coordinator to Eradicate Poverty, sparked outrage from the Christian community, which led to mass rioting and destruction. The skyrocketing death toll of those riots forced the local morgue to dig mass graves to compensate for the lack of space. The 2001 riots are a testament that Christians of Nigeria are not akin to sheep being led to the slaughter. Amidst the recent escalation in the country's north, Christian residents have already been stockpiling arms, becoming increasingly disillusioned from the government's willingness and capability to protect them.
Just as the Muslims carry out attacks against Christians and their places of worship in the north, the Christians are expected to respond forcefully and aggressively. In Jos, the new Christian arrivals from the north may look to seek revenge on those who made them flee, and the Muslim community of Jos may be their most viable target. Increasing fear of marginalization amongst the city's Muslims only plays to the hands of Boko Haram extremists, who undoubtedly see Jos as a key target in their campaign to destabilize the country. As with much of Nigeria's Muslims, many citizens of Jos already identify with the group for its stated goals of toppling the government for its widespread corruption, albeit through replacing it with a regime based on Shariah law. While the city has until now been spared from Boko Haram's wrath, it remains' clear that the Jos's Muslims will eventually be forced to display where their loyalty truly lies.
Given its geopolitical position and contemporary politics, the city of Jos is in many ways a microcosm for the whole of Nigeria. As such, Jos' descent into sectarian violence may be the first indicator for the collapse of stability in the nation's crucial beltway area, which has until now been spared from such turmoil. Should widespread violence hit Jos, it will only be a matter of time before other mixed cities in the area take note, eventually threatening peace in the political center of Abuja. In a striking, if not tragic coincidence, Christian citizens of Jos refer to their town as "Jesus our savior." If the city's history is any indicator, Jos will need its savior now more than ever, as the stability of Africa's most populous nation may just hang in the balance.
Thursday, January 26, 2012
REACTIONS TO ABUBAKAR'S APPOINTMENT
Indigenes of Plateau State last night expressed anger over the appointment of Alhaji Mohammed Dikko Abubakar as acting Inspector General of Police (IG) following the removal of Alhaji Hafiz Ringim from the office by President Goodluck Jonathan.
But a Lagos lawyer, Mr. Femi Falana, has eulogised the Federal Government for its guts in getting Ringim out of office.
Expressing rage over the appointment, the member representing Jos-South/Jos-East constituency in the House of Representatives, Honourable Bitrus Kaze, told THISDAY that: “It is amazing to me that at a time when Nigeria is witnessing a spate of terrorism, a man who has been indicted by the Justice Nikki Tobi Commission of Inquiry into the September 2001 crises in Jos, and recommended for dismissal from the police force by the commission, is the one found fit to lead the Nigerian Police.
“It is disheartening that those who have mentored terrorism in Nigeria are being asked to lead the police against the same terrorism. I cannot imagine it; I am shocked beyond words.”
In another reaction, the Special Assistant to Governor David Jang, Mr. Clinton Garuba, said it was disheartening and alarming that the president could appoint Abubakar as the IG.
He said: “AIG Abubakar is incompetent and lacks the credibility of a leader, and has been recommended for sack for his role in the 2001 crises in Plateau State by the Justice Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry.”
He added that “…at a time when the president himself has acknowledged that the Boko Haram sect has infiltrated his government, it is only logical that he appoints someone with a proven integrity and track record of performance to head the Nigerian Police, which is in a seeming position of helplessness due to bad leadership. We therefore call on the Senate, in the interest of Nigerians, not to confirm his appointment.”
Also speaking, a legal practitioner in the state, Mr. Harun Audu, said: “…though the prerogative lies with the president on the recommendation of the Police Service Commission to appoint whoever he feels competent, it will be wise for him to avail himself of every piece of information that will guide him in making a right choice.”
He said as a resident of Jos, “I am aware that M D Abubakar has some questions to answer concerning his performance and disposition in the 2001 Jos crisis”.
“I am also aware that he was found wanting by a commission of inquiry headed by no less a person of Justice Nikki Tobi. Perhaps, the president feels that the indictment is not damaging enough to affect his decision.
“I only think that the president stands the risk of being accused of insensitivity, considering that Justice Nikki Tobi report and recommendation is not a secret document, and has made a serious recommendation on the career of the person of M D Abubakar,” Audu said.
Abubakar was alleged to have masterminded the killings of Christians in Jos in 2001.
The Justice Tobi panel constituted in September 2001 by former Governor Joshua Dariye on the Jos crises had recommended his retirement from the Police Force.
The panel had said: “Religious fanatics should not be posted to head state police commands. The commission recommends that for his ignoble role during the September 2001 crises, which resulted in the loss of lives, the former Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, be advised to retire from the Nigeria Police Force and in the event of his refusal to do so, he should be dismissed from the service. The government should forward the recommendation to the Police Service Commission for consideration and necessary action.”
Meanwhile, Falana in a statement, said: “In spite of intensive pressure mounted on the presidency to retain Mr. Hafiz Ringim as the IGP, the Federal Government has eventually removed him from office in the national interest.
“The government deserves commendation for plucking up the courage to sack the police boss. The ex-IGP should however be made to account for the two leading Boko Haram suspects who escaped or were released by him and Mr. Zakari Biu.”
Falana further said: “The new IGP should see his appointment as a challenge to redeem the battered image of the police. Check points that have become extortion centres should be dismantled as beggars in police uniform on the highways are prone to compromise national security.
“The Nigeria Police Force should be repositioned to combat the menace of terrorism, armed robbery and other violent crimes. To do this effectively, Abubakar will have to restore the confidence of the Nigerian people in the police.”
Hausa community hails appointment of IGP
vanguard, on JANUARY 27, 2012
The Hausa community has hailed the appointment of Mohammed Abubarkar as acting Inspector General of Police by President Goodluck Jonathan.
They also condemned in strong terms the increasing spate of rampant bombings and killings by the radical Islamic sect, Boko Haram, in the northern part of the country. Speaking with newsmen, Friday, the Chairman of Hausa traders in Apapa, Alhaji Sani Abubakar, extolled the president’s decision to reform the police force in order to contain the Boko Haram insurgency.
While condemning the incessant killings in the north by the dreaded Boko Haram Sect, Alhaji Sani, urged southern not to retaliate the killings in the south as it might degenerate into a civil war.
According to him “ the move to appoint of Mr. Mohammed Abubarkar, as an acting Inspector General of Police, is police is absolutely the best thing that can happen to the country at this time intense security challenges in the country. Mr. Abubarkar has a history for proficiency, efficiency and acute intelligence in combating crime and violence.
Residents in Lagos and Ogun State can attest to this expertise during his days as the Commissioner of Police and Assistant Inspector General of these States. “We felt his qualities and abilities in combating crimes”.
“I also want to urge Christians and southerners in majority not to retaliate the killings in the north because it might lead swiftly into a civil war.
“Killing of northerners in south will spark off violent retaliatory killing in the north and southerners who are still in the north will surfer the born. So, I urge everyone to do everything possible in ensuring that this country remains united,” he stated.
ABUBAKAR INDICTED IN JOS IN 2001
REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN JOS AND ITS ENVIRONS, SEPTEMBER 2002
CHAPTER FOUR
4. PERSONS OR GROUP OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRISIS
4.0 The Commission decided to examine under this chapter, three categories of persons and or organizations:
(i) These are persons alleged to have committed offences during the 7th September, 2001 crisis.
(ii) Persons and or organizations which committed some wrong.
(iii) Persons and or organizations alleged to have committed some wrong but were not found liable.
4.1 Persons alleged to have committed offences:
The following persons were alleged to have committed different types of offences. Some of the persons appeared before the Commission and denied the allegations that they committed offences; some did not appear before the Commission. Since the Commission was not mandated to investigate the Commission of offences and the apportionment of criminality and possible sentence, it decided to give the names of the persons for possible police investigation and trial, if need be:
4.2 Persons and organizations that committed some wrongs
4.3 Alhaji M. D. Abubakar: The former Commissioner of Police
4.4 Of all the individuals, groups and organizations who were mentioned in the various memoranda as having played one role or the other with regard to the crisis, none received more scathing comments than Alhaji M. D. Abubakar, the Plateau State Commissioner of Police at the time of the crisis. He served in that capacity from 16/7/2000 to 16/11/2001. His name was mentioned in not less that fifty percent of the memoranda submitted to the Commission with varying degrees of condemnation of his role before and during the crisis. Such memoranda include Exhibits L, 16, 48, 52, 257, 470, 507, 521 and 524 among many others.
The oral evidence of witnesses before the Commission is equally replete with allegations that Alhaji M.D. Abubakar was responsible in one way or the other for causing the crisis or failing to curtail its severity or extent. The only dissenting voice is that of Assistant Commissioner of Police, Dominic Yadubiya, the Area Commander who signed and presented Exhibit 79, the Memorandum of the office of the Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command. While not condemning Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, Yadubiya did not praise him either.
4.5 The criticism of Alhaji M.D. Abubakar’s role in the crisis stems from the fact that apart from being a member of the State Security Council, he was at the helm of the Plateau State Police Command who’s admitted primary and constitutional role is to provide security of life and property to the people of the State. He was accused variously of neglecting or even undermining this role with serious consequences for the government and the people.
4.6 There is abundance of evidence that before the crisis erupted on 7th September, 2001 there was palpable tension in the air arising mainly from the controversial appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as the NAPEP Co-ordinator for Jos North Local Government Council. There were threats of violence expressed in the various correspondences written to the Government some of which were copied to him, the Commissioner of Police e. g Exhibit B, 70 and 71 among others. There were also the flyers containing threats to the life of Mukhtar pasted all around his office by unknown persons and the flyers being circulated in Jos allegedly written by the Hausa Fulani under 25 indicating that there would be violence if Mukhtar was not allowed to remain in office as NAPEP Co-ordinator.
When Alhaji Abubakar testified before the Commission, he admitted knowledge of all these and agreed that he knew that some kind of violence was in the offing. He was examined by Mr. Okereafor and this is how it went:
M.U. Okereafor: “When you saw these leaflets, you should have known there was tension on ground”
M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”
Earlier on, it had gone like this:
M.U. Okereafor: The summary of all these leaflets is that there was going to be a kind of violence involving lives”
M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”
M.U. Okereafor: “And you have told the Commission that the Police was aware of these leaftlets”
M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”
He was cross-examined by Mr. G. S. Pwul, leading counsel to the Commission as follows:
G.S. Pwul: “With such leaflets, did you sense that an unusual development was about to occur? Did the leaflets signal that an unusual development was about to happen?
M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”
G.S. Pwul: “If you did identify them, the right thing to do was to arrest them”
M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”
G.S. Pwul: “And that would have forestalled the problem of September”
M.D. Abubakar: “Yes and it would give us an insight as to why such leaflets were flying”
4.7 While being led by his counsel, Mr. O. Uket in his evidence in chief, he said as follows:
M.D. Abubakar: “Before the crisis of 7th September, there were a lot of rumours and a lot of leaflets due to the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar as the Co-ordinator of NAPEP for Jos North Local Government. As the Commissioner of Police and jointly with other Security agents, we conducted distress investigations about the happenings and we took certain security measures... We brought this to the notice of the government at the State Security Council meeting.”
O. Uket: “...what recommendations did you give the Government to stem the tension?”
M.D. Abubakar: “We became worried. I personally became very worried. I saw leaflets flying. There were leaflets reading “blood for blood” and others...”
4.8 Alhaji Abubakar also admitted that he was aware that tyres were burnt in front of the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and also in front of the Gbong Gwom Palace which he agreed was unlawful.
4.9 The major accusation against Alhaji Abubakar on this score is that with knowledge of all these events, he never caused the matter to be investigated so that those found to be behind these obvious threats to peace could be apprehended. But in his defence he said that he could not have anyone arrested because he did not know whom they were as none of the leaflets was signed by anybody. He said that he instructed that a detachment of police be deployed to Jos North Local Government and detectives sent to look for information relating to the crisis that was brewing as a result of Mukhtar’s appointment. He also said that he brought the issue up at the State Security Council meeting where it was agreed that the Government should look into the matter by calling all the interested parties with a view to finding out what was on ground in order to solve the problem.
4.10 Very significantly too, CW 41, Emmanuel Jok Bettah testified in line with his memorandum. Exhibit 52, that meetings were held by Muslims at Laranto Motor Park, Angwan Rogo and Gangare where the opposition to the appointment of Mukhtar was discussed and it was decided to set Jos ablaze on Friday 31st August, 2001 and that no `arne’ (infidel) would escape. He said he personally attended the meeting at Laranto Motor Park in disguise on 25th August, 2001. Among the decisions taken according to CW41, was the arrangement to stockpile arms, guns and knives in the Central Mosque and the houses of certain individuals.
According to CW41, the Chairman Jos North Local Government Council, Dr. Frank Tardy, the heads of Churches and Muslims who did not support the plan were to be the prime targets. He said he wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police which he personally delivered informing him of what he had seen and heard. A copy of his letter was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 53. He said he did not receive any reply to Exhibit 53 and added that the attack did not take place on 31st August, 2001 as planned because it rained on that day but that it happened on 7th September, 2001. Neither in his memorandum Exhibit 79, nor in his oral testimony did Alhaji Abubakar make any allusion to this vital evidence. It therefore stands uncontroverted and against him.
4.11 The Plateau State Youth Council, for its part, held a press conference on 31st August, 2001, the text of which was admitted as Exhibit S. Stating their opposition to Mukhtar’s appointment but at the same time blaming the Jasawa Development Association for any breach of the peace or breakdown of law and order that might occur in the State.
4.12 The press conference ended with a call on the “security operatives” to arrest and be made to face the law all the “agents of destabilization and their sponsors”.
4.13 The summary of the above scenario is that Alhaji M. D. Abubakar as Commissioner of Police was fully aware of the volatile situation that existed at the time but did nothing about it until it exploded on 7th September, 2001. Far more serious, however, is the allegation that he not only failed to take action to avert the crisis, but took certain active steps to facilitate it, for which he was accused of bias and even complicity. It was suggested before us that being himself a Muslim,
Alhaji Abubakar took sides with the Muslims and that using his position; he did certain things to aid the Muslims against the Christians in a crisis that had long been planned by the Muslims.
4.14 Appendix 12 to Exhibit 75 is a letter dated 29th August, 2001 by which Alhaji Abubakar, Commissioner of Police, Plateau State ordered the postings and transfers of thirty one Divisional Police Officers within Plateau State Command to different locations within the State “with immediate effect”. The letter was addressed to the Area Commander, Langtang, the Assistant Commissioner of Police `D’ Department (CID) Jos and All Divisional Police Officers of the Nigeria Police, Plateau State Command. The letter ended with the following instruction:
“2. Handing and taking over in respect of these postings should be completed latest by 3rd September, 2001 unfailingly. Date of respective arrivals at the new stations should be communicated to this State Headquarters immediately.”
4.15 When, during his oral testimony, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar was asked why he made those postings at the time he did bearing in mind that there was so much tension in the State, he said the postings were made because of the approaching retirement of three Divisional Police Officers, those of Barkin Ladi, Nasarawa Gwong and Bukuru. In his words:
“It is true that there were postings at Barkin Ladi, Nasarawa Gwong and Bukuru. This is the prerogative of the Commissioner of Police. We were not expecting crisis. These people were going on retirement and before you go on retirement, you take one month’s leave to get prepared for retirement. That is why the woman DPO in Barkin Ladi was changed. The man in Bukuru and the man in Nasarawa Gwong were changed. The situation brought changes and this was necessitated by their retirement period and I eased them out to put officers who are capable of taking care of these Divisions. That is why we made these transfers.”
4.16 There is also Exhibit 472 which is a Radio Message dated 7th September 2001 from Alhaji Abubakar, former Commissioner of Police to the Divisional Police Officers of Angware, Bassa and Riyom withdrawing the ALGON vehicles allocated to them to the State Headquarters. No explanation was given as to why this was done.
4.17 Several memoranda and several witnesses also accused Alhaji Abubakar of providing adequate security for mosques, especially the Central Mosque, Jos by posting policemen to be on guard while no Church was guarded or protected by the police, suggesting that he took sides with the Muslims against the Christians.
In answer to this charge, Alhaji Abubakar said that during the crisis, the Area Commander was instructed that all mosques and churches be guarded by policemen.
4.18 Exhibit 79 is the memorandum submitted by the Office of the Commissioner of Police. In the substance, it corroborates the evidence of Alhaji Abubakar, affirming that in the face of mounting tension in Jos North Local Government Council Area, he alerted the Plateau State Government about the situation and advised that a meeting of the State Security Council be held with all interest groups.
When the meeting was held, he, Alhaji Abubakar, was not invited. Generally, in Exhibit 79 and in his oral testimony, Alhaji Abubakar denied the allegations made against him and explained the steps taken by him to contain the crisis between the 7th and 12th of September, 2001. These included the deployment of conventional and Police Mobile Force men to the areas of conflict, the request for more men and arms from the Inspector General of Police and the request for the assistance of the Military for a joint operation with the Police.
4.19 There can be no doubt that the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar knew that something unusual involving violence was about to happen. That much was admitted by him and that was why he called for a meeting of the State Security Council. The hostile and war-like leaflets that were threatening bloodshed circulating all over the city of Jos, the forceful prevention of Mukhtar from occupying his office, the burning of tyres at the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and the Press Conference by the Plateau State Youth Council calling on the security agencies to arrest the agents of destabilization in our view, provided sufficient materials to make him take such measures as would nip the crisis in the bud or at least ensure that if it eventually erupted as it did, it could be effectively tackled and put down before much damage could be done. And if he was still unsure of what to do, C.W.41 had written to him, Exhibit 53, explaining how meetings were held by some Muslim groups where plans were made to attack some people and churches with arms that were to be distributed from certain locations. In the face of all these warning signals, we are, to say the least, very surprised that apart from calling for a meeting of the State Security Council to discuss the issue and his general statement that he deployed policemen to the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and detectives to look for information, he did nothing to avert the crisis. No serious investigation was carried out to fish out the belligerent groups and find out the extent of their plans, if any, and no arrests were made in spite of the fact that some of the dangerous leaflets were allegedly written by the “Hausa Fulani under 25”, a group which could, with some diligence be identified. His reason for not investigating or making any arrests was that no names were written on the leaflets and that the people behind them could not therefore be identified. Police have investigated such matters in the past. These events are so glaring and dramatic that we find it extremely difficult to excuse or justify Alhaji Abubakar’s handling of the situation. A diligent Commissioner of Police would not only have thoroughly investigated the matter before it happened, but would ensure that if the matter degenerated into the kind of bloodbath that eventually took place, his men were ready to contain it. He should have put them on red alert, but he never did. With his knowledge of the very volatile situation on ground, he ought to have made contingency arrangements with higher police authorities such that if widespread violence broke out he could receive immediate assistance by the deployment of more men and arms before the situation could get out of hand.
4.20 The evidence before the Commission is that because of the serious constraints under which the police operate throughout the country, when the crisis broke out on 7th September, 2001, the police were outnumbered and outgunned by the rioters and consequently, the police could not handle the situation, as confirmed by CW52, ACP Dominic Yadubiya. Alhaji Abubakar did request for reinforcements during the crisis and these came from Benue, Kaduna and Gombe Commands but it was too late. The damage had already been done. Had he placed his men on the alert and requested for rapid deployment from other commands in case of a breakdown of law and order, the police would have been more successful in managing the crisis and many lives and properties that were lost or destroyed could have been saved. The evidence before the Commission shows that it was the presence of the Military that brought the situation under control. The inability of the police to handle the situation resulted largely from the poor handling of the crisis by the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar at whose doorstep the blame must be laid. We are strengthened in this view by the evidence of CW330, the Secretary to the Plateau State Government. CW330 told the Commission that the Government was misled by the security reports given to it by the Police Command headed by its Commissioner, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar. The reports gave the Government the false impression that all was well and there was no cause for alarm. It was on the strength of these reports that the government assured the people that the situation was under control. The Secretary to the State Government in his testimony informed the Commission that it was known that an attack or demonstration was planned to take place on 31st August, 2001 and that there was an unusual movement of people contrary to the assurances given by the Commissioner of Police that the situation was under control. Even when the crisis broke out in Congo-Russia, the Commissioner of Police continued to assure government that the situation was under control until it became clear to everybody that it was not, and the President had to be contacted to allow the Military to intervene. CW330 described the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji Abubakar as “totally unreliable”. In fact even when Government informed him of the influx of visitors into Jos especially in Zangon Baki and Mista Ali areas and expressed its concern over it, Alhaji Abubakar did nothing. If Alhaji M.D. Abubakar had performed his duties well he would not have given the government that false sense of security that turned out to be fatal. In the light of this, the conclusion is inescapable that the former Commissioner of Police is guilty of, at best, gross negligence and at worst, sheer incompetence. This is on the passive side that is, on what he failed or omitted to do.
4.21 On the active side, it was alleged that the crisis occurred as a result of a premeditated and well planned attack on the Christian community by some Muslim groups with the active connivance of Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, he being a Muslim. In support of this allegation, evidence was given of Alhaji Abubakar’s conduct in three areas, namely, the transfer of some Divisional Police Officers shortly before the crisis, his withdrawal of the ALGON vehicles on the day the crisis erupted i.e. 7th September, 2001 and the imbalance in the provision of police security to places of worship during the crisis.
4.22 Let us now examine each of these in turn.
(i) The transfer of some Divisional Police Officers: Appendix 12 to Exhibit 75is a letter dated 29th August, 2001, by which the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, ordered the immediate transfer of thirty one Divisional Police Officers mainly within Jos and its environs from one Division to another. While most of the transfers were within the Jos area, some of them involved officers in places as far away as Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Pankshin, Kanke, and Wase. The evidence was that Alhaji Abubakar had foreknowledge of the crisis and that the transfers were made at such a critical time with the aim of disabling the officers from being effective in handling the crisis when it came. He denied the evidence and said that the posting of police officers is the prerogative of the Commissioner of Police. He said, and as indicated above, the transfers were made in preparation for the retirement of the Divisional Police Officers of Barkin Ladi, Nassarawa Gwong and Bukuru. He had to make the transfers so that these Divisions could be manned by capable hands. He called the exercise “routine changes” but admitted that with the situation where crisis was brewing it was not a responsible act to make such changes. He however said that it was not done with any bad intention.
4.23 The Commission finds Alhaji Abubakar’s explanation for the transfer of thirty-one Divisional Police officers because of the approaching retirement of three of them most unsatisfactory. In fact he could not really explain why he did it. The fact that it was done at a most inauspicious time lends credence to the fact that it was done with the ulterior motive of rendering the officers ineffective in their new places of posting. And if that is so, it must be because he knew of the planned attack by the Muslim groups and wanted to make it easy for them to succeed in their bid. Otherwise, how does one explain the fact that the transfers were made on 29th August, 2001 with the firm instruction that “Handing and taking over in respect of these postings should be completed latest by 3rd September 2001 unfailingly? And he added “Date of respective arrivals at the new stations should be communicated to this State Headquarters immediately.”
4.24 Assuming the officers got the notice of transfer the same day, i.e. 29th August 2001, they had less than five days within which to complete their movements and take over the new Divisions. The reason for this extreme urgency was not explained before us and we think the postings are far from being the innocent “route changes” he branded them to be, especially in the light of his admission under cross-examination that it takes time for a person to study the files he will take over in the new Station. Our view is that while Alhaji Abubakar’s postings of 29th August 2100, may not by themselves prove conclusively that he took sides with the Muslims against the Christians, taken together with the other two factors, they provide strong circumstantial evidence of his partisanship.
4.25 This is more so when one considers the evidence of CW330 that the State Security Council was informed by intelligence reports that the Muslims were planning a march in Jos on 7th September, 2001. Alhaji Abubakar did not take us to the bottom of this issue of sudden transfer.
4.26(ii) The withdrawal of ALGON Vehicles
It is a matter of common knowledge that all Local Government Council in the Country were provided with one vehicle each, (Toyota Jeep) to assist the police in its fight against crime. These vehicles are popularly referred to as ALGON vehicles. There is evidence that on 5th September, 2001, two days before the crisis erupted in Jos, the ALGON vehicles allocated to Angware, Bassa and Riyom Divisions were withdrawn through a wireless message, Exhibit 472, sent to these Divisions from the office of the Commissioner of Police for what is simply described as “special duty”. The vehicles were ordered to be released to the State Headquarters on Friday, 7th September, 2001, the day the civil disturbances erupted. Again there is no conclusive proof that it was done to facilitate the crisis. However, these areas are within the environs of Jos and no reason was given for their withdrawal. While we cannot speculate as to why they were withdrawn, we must say that the timing of the withdrawals was curious and they would definitely have the effect of crippling the operations of those Divisions in time of crisis. In the absence of any explanation coming from the Commissioner of Police, the Commission cannot say that the withdrawals for “special duty” which was unspecified were done in good faith or with a proper motive. We are more inclined to believe that the vehicles were withdrawn to satisfy the commissioner’s hidden agenda.
4.27 The unbalanced protection given to places of Worship: One of the most serious allegations against Alhaji M.D. Abubakar is that he took sides in the provision of protection to places of worship in a battle which he knew was fought along religious lines. It was very strongly alleged that during the crisis he gave police protection to the mosques in Jos, especially the Central Mosque, while he deliberately left the churches to the mercy of the rioters. This point is made in so many memoranda that it is impossible for the Commission to ignore it. While it will be tedious for us to reproduce all that was said before us on this very weighty matter, some examples taken from a few of the memoranda will suffice.
4.28(i) Page 8, paragraph 2 of Exhibit 498 (Memorandum No. 102/2001)
“Curiously, the Police prior to the Friday prayers heavily guarded the Central Mosque in Jos, while no security was provided for the churches in Jos. Paradoxically, the mosques were not under any form of threat on Friday 7, September, given that attack was launched on unsuspecting Christians. Yet many churches within a range of 200 to 500 metres from the Central mosque in Jos were burnt either fully or partially on the afternoon of that Friday. The Police in Plateau State will be the only group to account for this unbalanced action, which speaks volumes about the nature of policing in Jos and the rest of Plateau State.”
4.29(ii) Page 12, paragraph 3 of Exhibit 334 (Memorandum No. 342/2001)
“While innocent lives were freely taken from armless people, the best the Commissioner of Police could do was to protect the Central Mosque and other mosques at different locations in the town. No police protection was sent to any church.”
4.30(ii) Page 17 paragraph 1 of Exhibit 44 (Memorandum No. 20/2001)
“While all churches, Government establishments and other strategic premises were left helpless and at the mercy of the muslim hoodlums, the police were seen armed to the teeth strategically guarding the Jos Central Mosque.”
4.31(I) Page 8 paragraphs 2 and 3 of Exhibit 75 (Memorandum No. 102/2001)
“The Police Commissioner, M. D. Abubakar, who coincidentally hails from Zamfara had a field day, given the timely exit of the Chief Security Officer of the State, the Governor.... Most police were stationed to protect mosques, especially the Central and Dilimi Mosques.”
4.32 Both Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 denied this allegation and it was strongly denied in their memorandum, Exhibit 79. The evidence of Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 is that CW52 was instructed by Alhaji Abubakar and that he in turn instructed the various Divisional Police officers to provide police protection to all places of worship, both churches and mosques, within their respective areas. There is evidence before the Commission that Alhaji Abubakar’s normal places of worship on Fridays was the Mosque attached to the prisons near his office.
4.33 However, on this particular day, 7th September 2001 he worshipped at the Central Mosque. Alhaji Abubakar testified that he worshipped at the Central Mosque on 7th September, 2001 at the request of one of his friends who persuaded him that both of them should worship at the Central Mosque and not at the Prison Mosque.
He said:
“On Friday, 7th September when I was about to go to the mosque, a colleague of mine from Interpol at the Police Staff College called me to go to the mosque. Usually, I have two places of worship, the Central Mosque and the Prison Mosque. If not for my friend, I would have gone to the Prison mosque. He called me to wait for him so that we could go to the mosque. He said he wanted to go to Kano after the Mosque. He convinced me to go to the Central Mosque. We prayed outside because we got there late. I never pray outside. Two minutes after the prayers, we left immediately. On the way back, my friend took off on Kano and I went back to my office.”
4.34 He said he took five policemen to the Central Mosque as his escorts but did not notice the presence of other policemen there during or after the prayers. From this story, certain pertinent questions come to mind.
4.35(i) Since he never prays outside the mosque, what was so special about the Central Mosque on that day that made him yield to his friend’s prompting to drive all the way to the Central Mosque at the risk of arriving late and praying outside when he could have conveniently prayed inside the prison mosque which is just across the road from his office? Could it be because he wanted to police the situation at the Central Mosque, knowing what was about to happen?
4.36(ii) Having instructed that Mosques be guarded on Fridays and churches on Sundays as stated by him, why did he not take advantage of his presence at the Central Mosque to find out if his instruction was being implemented? Could this apparent lack of interest be because he knew what was about to happen, having made adequate arrangements for the protection of the Central Mosque? His behaviour in this regard is, to say the least, strange, if not abnormal.
4.37 From the evidence before the Commission, there can be little doubt that the Jos Central Mosque was well guarded on the day of the crisis. The only question is whether this protection was extended to the churches as well and if not, whether the omission was deliberate. Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 both admitted that churches which were in the vicinity of the Central Mosque, namely, COCIN Sarkin Mangu and Assemblies of God Church were burnt on 7th September 2001 while the Central Mosque was neither burnt nor damaged. Many houses and shops at Enugu Road very near or opposite the Central Mosque were also either set on fire or damaged. All these were viewed by the Commission during its visit to the locus in quo. C.W.52 and Alhaji Abubakar admitted that these churches were burnt down while the Central Mosque was left intact. They could not say why it was possible to burn all these structures while the Central Mosque remained untouched especially when it is known that some other mosques around the city were also burnt. It is obvious to the Commission that the Central Mosque was not burnt like the churches, shops and houses around it because it was heavily guarded by the police. Alhaji Abubakar said also that Fatima church was guarded by the police but he could not explain the burning of the church and its pastorium in spite of the protection allegedly provided by the police.
In considering this aspect of the matter, reference must be made to the case of Alhaji Dahiru Sule, CW319 who, when arrested with a double barrel gun on 8th September, 2001, said it was given to him by the Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar. The investigating police officer, one CSP Momoh wrote an Interim Report, to the Commissioner of Police, Exhibit 80B, in which he recommended that the suspect be released on bail because he appeared not to have committed any offence. Alhaji Abubakar told the Commission that he refused to approve the Report and issued a query to the officer, Exhibit 354, for taking Alhaji Dahiru Sule to Court on a First Information Report alleging inciting disturbance only while others arrested in connection with the disturbances were charged with the more serious offences of conspiracy, rioting, mischief by fire and unlawful possession of firearms.
Similarly, Alhaji Abubakar also queried one ASP Patricia Osaje for visiting the Magistrate’s Court where Dahiru Sule’s case was mentioned when she had no part to play in the investigation of the case.
4.38 When however, he was asked in cross examination whether he queried any of the policemen who stood guarding the Central Mosque and watching while churches, shops and houses were being set ablaze he admitted that he did not. When further questioned on why he did not query the policemen for this more serious dereliction of duty he said at first that he could not do so because he left Plateau State immediately after the crisis. But when he was reminded that his transfer only came on 16th November, 2001, two months after the crisis, he said that he was too busy attending to other matters in his effort to restore peace and had no time to issue queries. How strange!
4.39 The Commission does not believe that he had any intention of querying the said policemen who looked the other way when the churches were burning and this must be because they had firm instructions to guard only the Central Mosque. If that was not their instruction, they ought to have been queried because their conduct was more deserving of disciplinary measures than that of CSP Momoh and ASP Patricia Osaje.
4.40 On this score, it is clear to us that Alhaji Abubakar as Commissioner of Police ensured that the Central Mosque was adequately protected during the crisis but did not ensure that the churches, even those close to the Central Mosque, got the same or any protection at all. This is another evidence of his partisanship and the inference from this and the other facts considered in (i) and (ii) above is that Alhaji Abubakar did play an active role in the escalation of the crisis, pitching his tent, as it were, in the camp of the Muslims.
4.41 The Commission’s conclusion from proved facts therefore is that Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, former Commissioner of Police, Plateau State is one of the persons who, by acts of commission and omission, contributed to the crisis and must be held responsible as such. For a man of his position into whose hands the safety of lives and properties of Nigerian citizens was entrusted to have displayed such unethical conduct in the performance of his duties is most unfortunate. Because much was given to him, much was also expected of him but in the Commission’s view, he did not justify the trust reposed in him.
4.42 A Commissioner of Police of a State must bury his religious bias, leanings and inclinations qua superior police officer when he is performing his official duties of policing the state. He must, on no account, show to the public that he is either a Christian or a Muslim. In a country like Nigeria where religious belief is played to the gallery with all sentiment, thus affecting the sociological orientation of the people, the police must be seen as non-partisan in the regime of religion at all times and for all times. Unfortunately for Alhaji M. D. Abubakar, this was not the situation. He clearly showed his bias for the religion of Islam and his hatred for the religion of Christianity and this bias blinded his eyes, thoughts and orientation in the crisis of September, 2001 which resulted in the numerous killings.
4.43 In the light of the above, the Commission is of the view that Alhaji M. D. Abubakar be advised to retire from the Nigeria Police Force. In the event of his refusal to take the advice, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar should be dismissed from the service. The matter should be referred to the Police Service Commission for the appropriate disciplinary action as recommended above.