Thursday, January 26, 2012

REACTIONS TO ABUBAKAR'S APPOINTMENT

PLATEAU INDIGENES REACT TO ABUBAKAR'S APPOINTMENT
Thisday Newspaper, 26 January 2012, Seriki Adinoyi in Jos

Indigenes of Plateau State last night expressed anger over the appointment of Alhaji Mohammed Dikko Abubakar as acting Inspector General of Police (IG) following the removal of Alhaji Hafiz Ringim from the office by President Goodluck Jonathan.
But a Lagos lawyer, Mr. Femi Falana, has eulogised the Federal Government for its guts in getting Ringim out of office.

Expressing rage over the appointment, the member representing Jos-South/Jos-East constituency in the House of Representatives, Honourable Bitrus Kaze, told THISDAY that: “It is amazing to me that at a time when Nigeria is witnessing a spate of terrorism, a man who has been indicted by the Justice Nikki Tobi Commission of Inquiry into the September 2001 crises in Jos, and recommended for dismissal from the police force by the commission, is the one found fit to lead the Nigerian Police.

“It is disheartening that those who have mentored terrorism in Nigeria are being asked to lead the police against the same terrorism. I cannot imagine it; I am shocked beyond words.”

In another reaction, the Special Assistant to Governor David Jang, Mr. Clinton Garuba, said it was disheartening and alarming that the president could appoint Abubakar as the IG.

He said: “AIG Abubakar is incompetent and lacks the credibility of a leader, and has been recommended for sack for his role in the 2001 crises in Plateau State by the Justice Niki Tobi Commission of Inquiry.”

He added that “…at a time when the president himself has acknowledged that the Boko Haram sect has infiltrated his government, it is only logical that he appoints someone with a proven integrity and track record of performance to head the Nigerian Police, which is in a seeming position of helplessness due to bad leadership. We therefore call on the Senate, in the interest of Nigerians, not to confirm his appointment.”

Also speaking, a legal practitioner in the state, Mr. Harun Audu, said: “…though the prerogative lies with the president on the recommendation of the Police Service Commission to appoint whoever he feels competent, it will be wise for him to avail himself of every piece of information that will guide him in making a right choice.”
He said as a resident of Jos, “I am aware that M D Abubakar has some questions to answer concerning his performance and disposition in the 2001 Jos crisis”.

“I am also aware that he was found wanting by a commission of inquiry headed by no less a person of Justice Nikki Tobi. Perhaps, the president feels that the indictment is not damaging enough to affect his decision.
“I only think that the president stands the risk of being accused of insensitivity, considering that Justice Nikki Tobi report and recommendation is not a secret document, and has made a serious recommendation on the career of the person of M D Abubakar,” Audu said.

Abubakar was alleged to have masterminded the killings of Christians in Jos in 2001.
The Justice Tobi panel constituted in September 2001 by former Governor Joshua Dariye on the Jos crises had recommended his retirement from the Police Force.

The panel had said: “Religious fanatics should not be posted to head state police commands. The commission recommends that for his ignoble role during the September 2001 crises, which resulted in the loss of lives, the former Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, be advised to retire from the Nigeria Police Force and in the event of his refusal to do so, he should be dismissed from the service. The government should forward the recommendation to the Police Service Commission for consideration and necessary action.”

Meanwhile, Falana in a statement, said: “In spite of intensive pressure mounted on the presidency to retain Mr. Hafiz Ringim as the IGP, the Federal Government has eventually removed him from office in the national interest.

“The government deserves commendation for plucking up the courage to sack the police boss. The ex-IGP should however be made to account for the two leading Boko Haram suspects who escaped or were released by him and Mr. Zakari Biu.”

Falana further said: “The new IGP should see his appointment as a challenge to redeem the battered image of the police. Check points that have become extortion centres should be dismantled as beggars in police uniform on the highways are prone to compromise national security.

“The Nigeria Police Force should be repositioned to combat the menace of terrorism, armed robbery and other violent crimes. To do this effectively, Abubakar will have to restore the confidence of the Nigerian people in the police.”

Hausa community hails appointment of IGP

vanguard, on JANUARY 27, 2012

The Hausa community has hailed the appointment of Mohammed Abubarkar as acting Inspector General of Police by President Goodluck Jonathan.

They also condemned in strong terms the increasing spate of rampant bombings and killings by the radical Islamic sect, Boko Haram, in the northern part of the country. Speaking with newsmen, Friday, the Chairman of Hausa traders in Apapa, Alhaji Sani Abubakar, extolled the president’s decision to reform the police force in order to contain the Boko Haram insurgency.

While condemning the incessant killings in the north by the dreaded Boko Haram Sect, Alhaji Sani, urged southern not to retaliate the killings in the south as it might degenerate into a civil war.

According to him “ the move to appoint of Mr. Mohammed Abubarkar, as an acting Inspector General of Police, is police is absolutely the best thing that can happen to the country at this time intense security challenges in the country. Mr. Abubarkar has a history for proficiency, efficiency and acute intelligence in combating crime and violence.

Residents in Lagos and Ogun State can attest to this expertise during his days as the Commissioner of Police and Assistant Inspector General of these States. “We felt his qualities and abilities in combating crimes”.

“I also want to urge Christians and southerners in majority not to retaliate the killings in the north because it might lead swiftly into a civil war.

“Killing of northerners in south will spark off violent retaliatory killing in the north and southerners who are still in the north will surfer the born. So, I urge everyone to do everything possible in ensuring that this country remains united,” he stated.


ABUBAKAR INDICTED IN JOS IN 2001


REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE CIVIL DISTURBANCES IN JOS AND ITS ENVIRONS, SEPTEMBER 2002

CHAPTER FOUR

4. PERSONS OR GROUP OF PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CRISIS

4.0 The Commission decided to examine under this chapter, three categories of persons and or organizations:

(i) These are persons alleged to have committed offences during the 7th September, 2001 crisis.

(ii) Persons and or organizations which committed some wrong.

(iii) Persons and or organizations alleged to have committed some wrong but were not found liable.

4.1 Persons alleged to have committed offences:

The following persons were alleged to have committed different types of offences. Some of the persons appeared before the Commission and denied the allegations that they committed offences; some did not appear before the Commission. Since the Commission was not mandated to investigate the Commission of offences and the apportionment of criminality and possible sentence, it decided to give the names of the persons for possible police investigation and trial, if need be:

4.2 Persons and organizations that committed some wrongs

4.3 Alhaji M. D. Abubakar: The former Commissioner of Police

4.4 Of all the individuals, groups and organizations who were mentioned in the various memoranda as having played one role or the other with regard to the crisis, none received more scathing comments than Alhaji M. D. Abubakar, the Plateau State Commissioner of Police at the time of the crisis. He served in that capacity from 16/7/2000 to 16/11/2001. His name was mentioned in not less that fifty percent of the memoranda submitted to the Commission with varying degrees of condemnation of his role before and during the crisis. Such memoranda include Exhibits L, 16, 48, 52, 257, 470, 507, 521 and 524 among many others.

The oral evidence of witnesses before the Commission is equally replete with allegations that Alhaji M.D. Abubakar was responsible in one way or the other for causing the crisis or failing to curtail its severity or extent. The only dissenting voice is that of Assistant Commissioner of Police, Dominic Yadubiya, the Area Commander who signed and presented Exhibit 79, the Memorandum of the office of the Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command. While not condemning Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, Yadubiya did not praise him either.

4.5 The criticism of Alhaji M.D. Abubakar’s role in the crisis stems from the fact that apart from being a member of the State Security Council, he was at the helm of the Plateau State Police Command who’s admitted primary and constitutional role is to provide security of life and property to the people of the State. He was accused variously of neglecting or even undermining this role with serious consequences for the government and the people.

4.6 There is abundance of evidence that before the crisis erupted on 7th September, 2001 there was palpable tension in the air arising mainly from the controversial appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar Usman Mohammed as the NAPEP Co-ordinator for Jos North Local Government Council. There were threats of violence expressed in the various correspondences written to the Government some of which were copied to him, the Commissioner of Police e. g Exhibit B, 70 and 71 among others. There were also the flyers containing threats to the life of Mukhtar pasted all around his office by unknown persons and the flyers being circulated in Jos allegedly written by the Hausa Fulani under 25 indicating that there would be violence if Mukhtar was not allowed to remain in office as NAPEP Co-ordinator.

When Alhaji Abubakar testified before the Commission, he admitted knowledge of all these and agreed that he knew that some kind of violence was in the offing. He was examined by Mr. Okereafor and this is how it went:

M.U. Okereafor: “When you saw these leaflets, you should have known there was tension on ground”

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

Earlier on, it had gone like this:

M.U. Okereafor: The summary of all these leaflets is that there was going to be a kind of violence involving lives”

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

M.U. Okereafor: “And you have told the Commission that the Police was aware of these leaftlets”

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

He was cross-examined by Mr. G. S. Pwul, leading counsel to the Commission as follows:

G.S. Pwul: “With such leaflets, did you sense that an unusual development was about to occur? Did the leaflets signal that an unusual development was about to happen?

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

G.S. Pwul: “If you did identify them, the right thing to do was to arrest them”

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes”

G.S. Pwul: “And that would have forestalled the problem of September”

M.D. Abubakar: “Yes and it would give us an insight as to why such leaflets were flying”

4.7 While being led by his counsel, Mr. O. Uket in his evidence in chief, he said as follows:

M.D. Abubakar: “Before the crisis of 7th September, there were a lot of rumours and a lot of leaflets due to the appointment of Alhaji Mukhtar as the Co-ordinator of NAPEP for Jos North Local Government. As the Commissioner of Police and jointly with other Security agents, we conducted distress investigations about the happenings and we took certain security measures... We brought this to the notice of the government at the State Security Council meeting.”

O. Uket: “...what recommendations did you give the Government to stem the tension?”

M.D. Abubakar: “We became worried. I personally became very worried. I saw leaflets flying. There were leaflets reading “blood for blood” and others...”

4.8 Alhaji Abubakar also admitted that he was aware that tyres were burnt in front of the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and also in front of the Gbong Gwom Palace which he agreed was unlawful.

4.9 The major accusation against Alhaji Abubakar on this score is that with knowledge of all these events, he never caused the matter to be investigated so that those found to be behind these obvious threats to peace could be apprehended. But in his defence he said that he could not have anyone arrested because he did not know whom they were as none of the leaflets was signed by anybody. He said that he instructed that a detachment of police be deployed to Jos North Local Government and detectives sent to look for information relating to the crisis that was brewing as a result of Mukhtar’s appointment. He also said that he brought the issue up at the State Security Council meeting where it was agreed that the Government should look into the matter by calling all the interested parties with a view to finding out what was on ground in order to solve the problem.

4.10 Very significantly too, CW 41, Emmanuel Jok Bettah testified in line with his memorandum. Exhibit 52, that meetings were held by Muslims at Laranto Motor Park, Angwan Rogo and Gangare where the opposition to the appointment of Mukhtar was discussed and it was decided to set Jos ablaze on Friday 31st August, 2001 and that no `arne’ (infidel) would escape. He said he personally attended the meeting at Laranto Motor Park in disguise on 25th August, 2001. Among the decisions taken according to CW41, was the arrangement to stockpile arms, guns and knives in the Central Mosque and the houses of certain individuals.

According to CW41, the Chairman Jos North Local Government Council, Dr. Frank Tardy, the heads of Churches and Muslims who did not support the plan were to be the prime targets. He said he wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police which he personally delivered informing him of what he had seen and heard. A copy of his letter was admitted in evidence as Exhibit 53. He said he did not receive any reply to Exhibit 53 and added that the attack did not take place on 31st August, 2001 as planned because it rained on that day but that it happened on 7th September, 2001. Neither in his memorandum Exhibit 79, nor in his oral testimony did Alhaji Abubakar make any allusion to this vital evidence. It therefore stands uncontroverted and against him.

4.11 The Plateau State Youth Council, for its part, held a press conference on 31st August, 2001, the text of which was admitted as Exhibit S. Stating their opposition to Mukhtar’s appointment but at the same time blaming the Jasawa Development Association for any breach of the peace or breakdown of law and order that might occur in the State.

4.12 The press conference ended with a call on the “security operatives” to arrest and be made to face the law all the “agents of destabilization and their sponsors”.

4.13 The summary of the above scenario is that Alhaji M. D. Abubakar as Commissioner of Police was fully aware of the volatile situation that existed at the time but did nothing about it until it exploded on 7th September, 2001. Far more serious, however, is the allegation that he not only failed to take action to avert the crisis, but took certain active steps to facilitate it, for which he was accused of bias and even complicity. It was suggested before us that being himself a Muslim,

Alhaji Abubakar took sides with the Muslims and that using his position; he did certain things to aid the Muslims against the Christians in a crisis that had long been planned by the Muslims.

4.14 Appendix 12 to Exhibit 75 is a letter dated 29th August, 2001 by which Alhaji Abubakar, Commissioner of Police, Plateau State ordered the postings and transfers of thirty one Divisional Police Officers within Plateau State Command to different locations within the State “with immediate effect”. The letter was addressed to the Area Commander, Langtang, the Assistant Commissioner of Police `D’ Department (CID) Jos and All Divisional Police Officers of the Nigeria Police, Plateau State Command. The letter ended with the following instruction:

“2. Handing and taking over in respect of these postings should be completed latest by 3rd September, 2001 unfailingly. Date of respective arrivals at the new stations should be communicated to this State Headquarters immediately.”

4.15 When, during his oral testimony, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar was asked why he made those postings at the time he did bearing in mind that there was so much tension in the State, he said the postings were made because of the approaching retirement of three Divisional Police Officers, those of Barkin Ladi, Nasarawa Gwong and Bukuru. In his words:

“It is true that there were postings at Barkin Ladi, Nasarawa Gwong and Bukuru. This is the prerogative of the Commissioner of Police. We were not expecting crisis. These people were going on retirement and before you go on retirement, you take one month’s leave to get prepared for retirement. That is why the woman DPO in Barkin Ladi was changed. The man in Bukuru and the man in Nasarawa Gwong were changed. The situation brought changes and this was necessitated by their retirement period and I eased them out to put officers who are capable of taking care of these Divisions. That is why we made these transfers.”

4.16 There is also Exhibit 472 which is a Radio Message dated 7th September 2001 from Alhaji Abubakar, former Commissioner of Police to the Divisional Police Officers of Angware, Bassa and Riyom withdrawing the ALGON vehicles allocated to them to the State Headquarters. No explanation was given as to why this was done.

4.17 Several memoranda and several witnesses also accused Alhaji Abubakar of providing adequate security for mosques, especially the Central Mosque, Jos by posting policemen to be on guard while no Church was guarded or protected by the police, suggesting that he took sides with the Muslims against the Christians.

In answer to this charge, Alhaji Abubakar said that during the crisis, the Area Commander was instructed that all mosques and churches be guarded by policemen.

4.18 Exhibit 79 is the memorandum submitted by the Office of the Commissioner of Police. In the substance, it corroborates the evidence of Alhaji Abubakar, affirming that in the face of mounting tension in Jos North Local Government Council Area, he alerted the Plateau State Government about the situation and advised that a meeting of the State Security Council be held with all interest groups.

When the meeting was held, he, Alhaji Abubakar, was not invited. Generally, in Exhibit 79 and in his oral testimony, Alhaji Abubakar denied the allegations made against him and explained the steps taken by him to contain the crisis between the 7th and 12th of September, 2001. These included the deployment of conventional and Police Mobile Force men to the areas of conflict, the request for more men and arms from the Inspector General of Police and the request for the assistance of the Military for a joint operation with the Police.

4.19 There can be no doubt that the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar knew that something unusual involving violence was about to happen. That much was admitted by him and that was why he called for a meeting of the State Security Council. The hostile and war-like leaflets that were threatening bloodshed circulating all over the city of Jos, the forceful prevention of Mukhtar from occupying his office, the burning of tyres at the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and the Press Conference by the Plateau State Youth Council calling on the security agencies to arrest the agents of destabilization in our view, provided sufficient materials to make him take such measures as would nip the crisis in the bud or at least ensure that if it eventually erupted as it did, it could be effectively tackled and put down before much damage could be done. And if he was still unsure of what to do, C.W.41 had written to him, Exhibit 53, explaining how meetings were held by some Muslim groups where plans were made to attack some people and churches with arms that were to be distributed from certain locations. In the face of all these warning signals, we are, to say the least, very surprised that apart from calling for a meeting of the State Security Council to discuss the issue and his general statement that he deployed policemen to the Jos North Local Government Secretariat and detectives to look for information, he did nothing to avert the crisis. No serious investigation was carried out to fish out the belligerent groups and find out the extent of their plans, if any, and no arrests were made in spite of the fact that some of the dangerous leaflets were allegedly written by the “Hausa Fulani under 25”, a group which could, with some diligence be identified. His reason for not investigating or making any arrests was that no names were written on the leaflets and that the people behind them could not therefore be identified. Police have investigated such matters in the past. These events are so glaring and dramatic that we find it extremely difficult to excuse or justify Alhaji Abubakar’s handling of the situation. A diligent Commissioner of Police would not only have thoroughly investigated the matter before it happened, but would ensure that if the matter degenerated into the kind of bloodbath that eventually took place, his men were ready to contain it. He should have put them on red alert, but he never did. With his knowledge of the very volatile situation on ground, he ought to have made contingency arrangements with higher police authorities such that if widespread violence broke out he could receive immediate assistance by the deployment of more men and arms before the situation could get out of hand.

4.20 The evidence before the Commission is that because of the serious constraints under which the police operate throughout the country, when the crisis broke out on 7th September, 2001, the police were outnumbered and outgunned by the rioters and consequently, the police could not handle the situation, as confirmed by CW52, ACP Dominic Yadubiya. Alhaji Abubakar did request for reinforcements during the crisis and these came from Benue, Kaduna and Gombe Commands but it was too late. The damage had already been done. Had he placed his men on the alert and requested for rapid deployment from other commands in case of a breakdown of law and order, the police would have been more successful in managing the crisis and many lives and properties that were lost or destroyed could have been saved. The evidence before the Commission shows that it was the presence of the Military that brought the situation under control. The inability of the police to handle the situation resulted largely from the poor handling of the crisis by the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar at whose doorstep the blame must be laid. We are strengthened in this view by the evidence of CW330, the Secretary to the Plateau State Government. CW330 told the Commission that the Government was misled by the security reports given to it by the Police Command headed by its Commissioner, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar. The reports gave the Government the false impression that all was well and there was no cause for alarm. It was on the strength of these reports that the government assured the people that the situation was under control. The Secretary to the State Government in his testimony informed the Commission that it was known that an attack or demonstration was planned to take place on 31st August, 2001 and that there was an unusual movement of people contrary to the assurances given by the Commissioner of Police that the situation was under control. Even when the crisis broke out in Congo-Russia, the Commissioner of Police continued to assure government that the situation was under control until it became clear to everybody that it was not, and the President had to be contacted to allow the Military to intervene. CW330 described the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji Abubakar as “totally unreliable”. In fact even when Government informed him of the influx of visitors into Jos especially in Zangon Baki and Mista Ali areas and expressed its concern over it, Alhaji Abubakar did nothing. If Alhaji M.D. Abubakar had performed his duties well he would not have given the government that false sense of security that turned out to be fatal. In the light of this, the conclusion is inescapable that the former Commissioner of Police is guilty of, at best, gross negligence and at worst, sheer incompetence. This is on the passive side that is, on what he failed or omitted to do.

4.21 On the active side, it was alleged that the crisis occurred as a result of a premeditated and well planned attack on the Christian community by some Muslim groups with the active connivance of Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, he being a Muslim. In support of this allegation, evidence was given of Alhaji Abubakar’s conduct in three areas, namely, the transfer of some Divisional Police Officers shortly before the crisis, his withdrawal of the ALGON vehicles on the day the crisis erupted i.e. 7th September, 2001 and the imbalance in the provision of police security to places of worship during the crisis.

4.22 Let us now examine each of these in turn.

(i) The transfer of some Divisional Police Officers: Appendix 12 to Exhibit 75is a letter dated 29th August, 2001, by which the former Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, ordered the immediate transfer of thirty one Divisional Police Officers mainly within Jos and its environs from one Division to another. While most of the transfers were within the Jos area, some of them involved officers in places as far away as Riyom, Barkin Ladi, Pankshin, Kanke, and Wase. The evidence was that Alhaji Abubakar had foreknowledge of the crisis and that the transfers were made at such a critical time with the aim of disabling the officers from being effective in handling the crisis when it came. He denied the evidence and said that the posting of police officers is the prerogative of the Commissioner of Police. He said, and as indicated above, the transfers were made in preparation for the retirement of the Divisional Police Officers of Barkin Ladi, Nassarawa Gwong and Bukuru. He had to make the transfers so that these Divisions could be manned by capable hands. He called the exercise “routine changes” but admitted that with the situation where crisis was brewing it was not a responsible act to make such changes. He however said that it was not done with any bad intention.

4.23 The Commission finds Alhaji Abubakar’s explanation for the transfer of thirty-one Divisional Police officers because of the approaching retirement of three of them most unsatisfactory. In fact he could not really explain why he did it. The fact that it was done at a most inauspicious time lends credence to the fact that it was done with the ulterior motive of rendering the officers ineffective in their new places of posting. And if that is so, it must be because he knew of the planned attack by the Muslim groups and wanted to make it easy for them to succeed in their bid. Otherwise, how does one explain the fact that the transfers were made on 29th August, 2001 with the firm instruction that “Handing and taking over in respect of these postings should be completed latest by 3rd September 2001 unfailingly? And he added “Date of respective arrivals at the new stations should be communicated to this State Headquarters immediately.”

4.24 Assuming the officers got the notice of transfer the same day, i.e. 29th August 2001, they had less than five days within which to complete their movements and take over the new Divisions. The reason for this extreme urgency was not explained before us and we think the postings are far from being the innocent “route changes” he branded them to be, especially in the light of his admission under cross-examination that it takes time for a person to study the files he will take over in the new Station. Our view is that while Alhaji Abubakar’s postings of 29th August 2100, may not by themselves prove conclusively that he took sides with the Muslims against the Christians, taken together with the other two factors, they provide strong circumstantial evidence of his partisanship.

4.25 This is more so when one considers the evidence of CW330 that the State Security Council was informed by intelligence reports that the Muslims were planning a march in Jos on 7th September, 2001. Alhaji Abubakar did not take us to the bottom of this issue of sudden transfer.

4.26(ii) The withdrawal of ALGON Vehicles

It is a matter of common knowledge that all Local Government Council in the Country were provided with one vehicle each, (Toyota Jeep) to assist the police in its fight against crime. These vehicles are popularly referred to as ALGON vehicles. There is evidence that on 5th September, 2001, two days before the crisis erupted in Jos, the ALGON vehicles allocated to Angware, Bassa and Riyom Divisions were withdrawn through a wireless message, Exhibit 472, sent to these Divisions from the office of the Commissioner of Police for what is simply described as “special duty”. The vehicles were ordered to be released to the State Headquarters on Friday, 7th September, 2001, the day the civil disturbances erupted. Again there is no conclusive proof that it was done to facilitate the crisis. However, these areas are within the environs of Jos and no reason was given for their withdrawal. While we cannot speculate as to why they were withdrawn, we must say that the timing of the withdrawals was curious and they would definitely have the effect of crippling the operations of those Divisions in time of crisis. In the absence of any explanation coming from the Commissioner of Police, the Commission cannot say that the withdrawals for “special duty” which was unspecified were done in good faith or with a proper motive. We are more inclined to believe that the vehicles were withdrawn to satisfy the commissioner’s hidden agenda.

4.27 The unbalanced protection given to places of Worship: One of the most serious allegations against Alhaji M.D. Abubakar is that he took sides in the provision of protection to places of worship in a battle which he knew was fought along religious lines. It was very strongly alleged that during the crisis he gave police protection to the mosques in Jos, especially the Central Mosque, while he deliberately left the churches to the mercy of the rioters. This point is made in so many memoranda that it is impossible for the Commission to ignore it. While it will be tedious for us to reproduce all that was said before us on this very weighty matter, some examples taken from a few of the memoranda will suffice.

4.28(i) Page 8, paragraph 2 of Exhibit 498 (Memorandum No. 102/2001)

“Curiously, the Police prior to the Friday prayers heavily guarded the Central Mosque in Jos, while no security was provided for the churches in Jos. Paradoxically, the mosques were not under any form of threat on Friday 7, September, given that attack was launched on unsuspecting Christians. Yet many churches within a range of 200 to 500 metres from the Central mosque in Jos were burnt either fully or partially on the afternoon of that Friday. The Police in Plateau State will be the only group to account for this unbalanced action, which speaks volumes about the nature of policing in Jos and the rest of Plateau State.”

4.29(ii) Page 12, paragraph 3 of Exhibit 334 (Memorandum No. 342/2001)

“While innocent lives were freely taken from armless people, the best the Commissioner of Police could do was to protect the Central Mosque and other mosques at different locations in the town. No police protection was sent to any church.”

4.30(ii) Page 17 paragraph 1 of Exhibit 44 (Memorandum No. 20/2001)

“While all churches, Government establishments and other strategic premises were left helpless and at the mercy of the muslim hoodlums, the police were seen armed to the teeth strategically guarding the Jos Central Mosque.”

4.31(I) Page 8 paragraphs 2 and 3 of Exhibit 75 (Memorandum No. 102/2001)

“The Police Commissioner, M. D. Abubakar, who coincidentally hails from Zamfara had a field day, given the timely exit of the Chief Security Officer of the State, the Governor.... Most police were stationed to protect mosques, especially the Central and Dilimi Mosques.”

4.32 Both Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 denied this allegation and it was strongly denied in their memorandum, Exhibit 79. The evidence of Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 is that CW52 was instructed by Alhaji Abubakar and that he in turn instructed the various Divisional Police officers to provide police protection to all places of worship, both churches and mosques, within their respective areas. There is evidence before the Commission that Alhaji Abubakar’s normal places of worship on Fridays was the Mosque attached to the prisons near his office.

4.33 However, on this particular day, 7th September 2001 he worshipped at the Central Mosque. Alhaji Abubakar testified that he worshipped at the Central Mosque on 7th September, 2001 at the request of one of his friends who persuaded him that both of them should worship at the Central Mosque and not at the Prison Mosque.

He said:

“On Friday, 7th September when I was about to go to the mosque, a colleague of mine from Interpol at the Police Staff College called me to go to the mosque. Usually, I have two places of worship, the Central Mosque and the Prison Mosque. If not for my friend, I would have gone to the Prison mosque. He called me to wait for him so that we could go to the mosque. He said he wanted to go to Kano after the Mosque. He convinced me to go to the Central Mosque. We prayed outside because we got there late. I never pray outside. Two minutes after the prayers, we left immediately. On the way back, my friend took off on Kano and I went back to my office.”

4.34 He said he took five policemen to the Central Mosque as his escorts but did not notice the presence of other policemen there during or after the prayers. From this story, certain pertinent questions come to mind.

4.35(i) Since he never prays outside the mosque, what was so special about the Central Mosque on that day that made him yield to his friend’s prompting to drive all the way to the Central Mosque at the risk of arriving late and praying outside when he could have conveniently prayed inside the prison mosque which is just across the road from his office? Could it be because he wanted to police the situation at the Central Mosque, knowing what was about to happen?

4.36(ii) Having instructed that Mosques be guarded on Fridays and churches on Sundays as stated by him, why did he not take advantage of his presence at the Central Mosque to find out if his instruction was being implemented? Could this apparent lack of interest be because he knew what was about to happen, having made adequate arrangements for the protection of the Central Mosque? His behaviour in this regard is, to say the least, strange, if not abnormal.

4.37 From the evidence before the Commission, there can be little doubt that the Jos Central Mosque was well guarded on the day of the crisis. The only question is whether this protection was extended to the churches as well and if not, whether the omission was deliberate. Alhaji Abubakar and CW52 both admitted that churches which were in the vicinity of the Central Mosque, namely, COCIN Sarkin Mangu and Assemblies of God Church were burnt on 7th September 2001 while the Central Mosque was neither burnt nor damaged. Many houses and shops at Enugu Road very near or opposite the Central Mosque were also either set on fire or damaged. All these were viewed by the Commission during its visit to the locus in quo. C.W.52 and Alhaji Abubakar admitted that these churches were burnt down while the Central Mosque was left intact. They could not say why it was possible to burn all these structures while the Central Mosque remained untouched especially when it is known that some other mosques around the city were also burnt. It is obvious to the Commission that the Central Mosque was not burnt like the churches, shops and houses around it because it was heavily guarded by the police. Alhaji Abubakar said also that Fatima church was guarded by the police but he could not explain the burning of the church and its pastorium in spite of the protection allegedly provided by the police.

In considering this aspect of the matter, reference must be made to the case of Alhaji Dahiru Sule, CW319 who, when arrested with a double barrel gun on 8th September, 2001, said it was given to him by the Commissioner of Police, Alhaji M.D. Abubakar. The investigating police officer, one CSP Momoh wrote an Interim Report, to the Commissioner of Police, Exhibit 80B, in which he recommended that the suspect be released on bail because he appeared not to have committed any offence. Alhaji Abubakar told the Commission that he refused to approve the Report and issued a query to the officer, Exhibit 354, for taking Alhaji Dahiru Sule to Court on a First Information Report alleging inciting disturbance only while others arrested in connection with the disturbances were charged with the more serious offences of conspiracy, rioting, mischief by fire and unlawful possession of firearms.

Similarly, Alhaji Abubakar also queried one ASP Patricia Osaje for visiting the Magistrate’s Court where Dahiru Sule’s case was mentioned when she had no part to play in the investigation of the case.

4.38 When however, he was asked in cross examination whether he queried any of the policemen who stood guarding the Central Mosque and watching while churches, shops and houses were being set ablaze he admitted that he did not. When further questioned on why he did not query the policemen for this more serious dereliction of duty he said at first that he could not do so because he left Plateau State immediately after the crisis. But when he was reminded that his transfer only came on 16th November, 2001, two months after the crisis, he said that he was too busy attending to other matters in his effort to restore peace and had no time to issue queries. How strange!

4.39 The Commission does not believe that he had any intention of querying the said policemen who looked the other way when the churches were burning and this must be because they had firm instructions to guard only the Central Mosque. If that was not their instruction, they ought to have been queried because their conduct was more deserving of disciplinary measures than that of CSP Momoh and ASP Patricia Osaje.

4.40 On this score, it is clear to us that Alhaji Abubakar as Commissioner of Police ensured that the Central Mosque was adequately protected during the crisis but did not ensure that the churches, even those close to the Central Mosque, got the same or any protection at all. This is another evidence of his partisanship and the inference from this and the other facts considered in (i) and (ii) above is that Alhaji Abubakar did play an active role in the escalation of the crisis, pitching his tent, as it were, in the camp of the Muslims.

4.41 The Commission’s conclusion from proved facts therefore is that Alhaji M.D. Abubakar, former Commissioner of Police, Plateau State is one of the persons who, by acts of commission and omission, contributed to the crisis and must be held responsible as such. For a man of his position into whose hands the safety of lives and properties of Nigerian citizens was entrusted to have displayed such unethical conduct in the performance of his duties is most unfortunate. Because much was given to him, much was also expected of him but in the Commission’s view, he did not justify the trust reposed in him.

4.42 A Commissioner of Police of a State must bury his religious bias, leanings and inclinations qua superior police officer when he is performing his official duties of policing the state. He must, on no account, show to the public that he is either a Christian or a Muslim. In a country like Nigeria where religious belief is played to the gallery with all sentiment, thus affecting the sociological orientation of the people, the police must be seen as non-partisan in the regime of religion at all times and for all times. Unfortunately for Alhaji M. D. Abubakar, this was not the situation. He clearly showed his bias for the religion of Islam and his hatred for the religion of Christianity and this bias blinded his eyes, thoughts and orientation in the crisis of September, 2001 which resulted in the numerous killings.

4.43 In the light of the above, the Commission is of the view that Alhaji M. D. Abubakar be advised to retire from the Nigeria Police Force. In the event of his refusal to take the advice, Alhaji M. D. Abubakar should be dismissed from the service. The matter should be referred to the Police Service Commission for the appropriate disciplinary action as recommended above.

Tuesday, January 24, 2012

BOKO HARAM ON GOVS PAYROLL?


The Vanguard Newspaper reported a story on 24 January 2012 to the effect that the Boko Haram islamic sect has claimed being on the payroll of several northern Nigerian States Governors. Since the report came out, none of the indicted Governors has issued a rebuttal. Is this a tacit acceptance of complicity?

My Member in the House of Representatives, Hon. Bitrus Kaze, (Picture rght) commented on this news item on his facebook page as follows:

"I join many all well-meaning Nigerians in sympathizing with the people of Kano. But frankly speaking, the report that Boko Haram's favourite training camps are in Bauchi State cannot be breaking news!
Recall my advertorial on The Nation newspaper of 25th March 2010? I had said, "Some of the Fulanis who were arrested in Jos East confessed they were fleeing back to their training camps in Bauchi State... In perilous times such as now, signals emanating from Bauchi State may not be that of an enemy, they are surely not that of a friend either."
The Punch Newspaper of 25th Sept, 2011 report that "Men of the Bauchi State Police command have raided a terrorist training camp in the Toro Local Government Area of the state, arresting 10 men and recovering arms and ammunition. The leader of the camp was in the process of recruiting another 35 people for training before the camp was invaded by the police."
Any wonder why the Sultan is not blaming political leaders for the Kano multiple bombings? Gov Mu'azu Babangida Aliyu of Niger State has not convened an emergency meeting of Northern Governors over Madalla or Kano bombings neither has he reacted the Vanguard newspaper reports that some Northern Govs pay millions to the Boko Haram on a monthly basis!
Had the sordid events Madalla or Kano occurred in Jos, would they have kept silent? Are Jos Plateau people not being vindicated by the day! Is anyone surprised that Jos is returning to its original status of hosting refugees from crisis zones?"

TISHAU OF BOKO HARAM SPEAKS


The Punch Interview: "I Told The Inspector General Of Police In Advance That Abuja Would Be Bombed," Says Boko Haram Leader


What is Boko Haram about?


Our aim is to spread Islam all over Nigeria, that is our mission and I want people to understand that our correct name is Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad. Those calling our group Boko Haram do so to discredit the group and its ideas. It was formed at three fundamental levels.

The first level from which our group emerged was from people in this country who, for selfish reasons, recruited young people and sometimes children and sent them overseas for education. In reality, these people are totally ignorant of the reasons why these big men take them abroad. In the name of education, these young men are taken to mostly Arab countries and turned into militants who respect only those who sponsored them abroad. Those big men who sponsor these youths don’t have any conscience and no love for this country. 

It all started in 2004 when the Government of Mauritania fell.


It is similar to what is happening in Libya now, though slightly different. When the government in Mauritania fell in 2004, some individuals from that country came into Nigeria to recruit some youths as mercenaries to join forces with them to overthrow the government in power.


The second level of our membership is made up of young men who were recruited by our late leader, Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf was approached by some people from Mauritania to recruit more Nigerians to continue with the struggle in Mauritania. The grounds were that these young people were being recruited to further their Islamic studies. They were to serve as a support group to the Mauritanian army. But our leader Mohammed Yusuf rejected the plan. But a number of Nigerian big men who were involved in the Mauritania struggle were angry with Yusuf. This led to a disagreement which pitched the young men loyal to Yusuf against those backing the big men. Yusuf, however, insisted on genuine Islam whereas those opposing him were mercenaries who were willing to serve their master’s interest in Mauritania.


At what point did they leave perfect Islam and become violent? 


Whatever I am telling you now I have already made available to the SSS when they arrested me. There was a misunderstanding within the group and this disagreement was between those who received military training in Mauritania and those who were loyal to Yusuf. The SSS infiltrated our ranks and began to arrest many of those who were militants. However, as they were arrested some big men moved in to ensure that the court released them and they came back causing more problems within our group.


In 2009 the disagreement developed into a crisis in areas where our group was spreading Islamic ideals. I was in charge of our operations in Bauchi, Gombe and Plateau. The crisis was more in Bauchi State, in two locations and in Kano in one location. In Bauchi, a group began to lay claim to a mosque that was built by our group. This caused a major crisis again and a young girl was kidnapped in Bauchi and taken to Borno State. Our group was fingered but we told one intelligence officer, Bala, who was investigating the case that her relations took her to Borno and if the issue was not handled well it could cause a crisis. The SSS directed us to contact the Commissioner of Police in Borno State to secure the girl’s release. We were still in the process when the Bauchi State governor directed that members of our group should be driven away from the state. That was how our people started to resist the forced evacuation and the crisis with the government spread to Borno State. In fact, the crisis began in Bauchi and not Borno.


Anytime there is a bombing in Nigeria Boko Haram claims responsibility, for example, four times in Borno Police headquarters and the UN office in Abuja.


Yes, we bombed some of those places you mentioned. Remember I told you that some of our members were recalled from military training in Mauritania. Among them were three specialist in bomb making.


When this crisis began I made a move to the authorities advising that the arrest of Boko Haram members would not bring an end to the crisis. I suggested that the government should stop the arrest and release those already arrested. Let me repeat it today, government should rebuild houses, mosques and schools demolished in Bauchi and Borno states. Government should not interfere in the genuine worship of our group and ensure justice for all. If these are not in place, I predict that the Nigerian situation may become like what is happening in Somalia.

I give this warning because many of those young men who went to Mauritania are being attracted back home because of the violent situation brought by the present crisis.


When I gave my advice, the police chased and arrested me, and kept me in detention. Before I was detained, I gave the police the video recordings of how some of our members were being given military training, but the IGP ordered that I should be detained. I was left in detention for 10 months. 


But those things that I warned about are playing out today. While I was in detention, I was in contact with our people and I still gave forewarnings to the authorities about attacks. I even told them beforehand whenever an operation was to take place. The bombing of the police headquarters had been planned and on many occasions I had always told them in advance.


In fact, Bala had helped the police because each time I got in touch with him he worked to avert the attacks. If not, the police headquarters would have been bombed before now. Three days before the attack I warned the police that there would be an attack in Abuja that would embarrass the security authorities. Also, after the bombing of the police headquarters, I was summoned before the IGP and given a GSM phone. I called the person who planned and led the attack and we spoke right in front of the IGP. So, all these terror attacks are caused by the negligence of government.


Since I was released from detention, I have rejoined my group and some of us have warned our members to stick to the original ideals of our leader, Yusuf. He did not tell us to kill innocent people or to break into and steal from banks. If there is a conflict between the faithful and the authorities our opposition should be against the authorities and not the talakawas.


There are allegations that Boko Haram is being sponsored by some top level politicians, is it true?


The truth is that politicians are the root cause of this Boko Haram problem. For instance, in Borno State, the governor sponsors a group of armed youths known as ECOMOG. It is this ECOMOG that the governor formed and looks after, above the police, SSS and other security agencies. In Gombe State, the governor has the Kalari. I was once contacted by a governorship candidate to kill an opponent for a fee. The security agencies know what I am telling you.


In Bauchi there is the Tarafuka, an armed group sponsored by the government, and the government watches on, even when we have the SSS and police. That is why our new leader, Mallam Abubakar Shekau, is calling on the youths to disregard all government in the country – a call that has brought him and the group into conflict with the government. Some politicians are now taking the advantage of the conflict between the Boko Haram leadership and the authorities to execute their own agenda.


Did Boko Haram bomb the United Nations Office in Abuja?


I would not answer the question of whether Boko Haram bombed the UN building or not for some reasons.


Did Boko Haram bomb the Police headquarters in Abuja?


Yes, we bombed the police headquarters in Abuja. I told you earlier that when the bombing of the Police headquarters happened I called the person who led the attack, I was in front of the IGP. Yes, we bombed the police headquarters in Abuja. They asked me why we bombed the police headquarters and I told him (IGP) in his presence that it was because of his statement in Maiduguri that the days of Boko Haram were numbered.


Why does Boko Haram bomb army barracks and attack police and security operatives? What do they do to affect Islam or the work of Boko Haram?


It is because of the indiscriminate killing of our members and innocent people by the police without trial. They arrest innocent people harass and shoot them and the authorities do nothing about it. Why should we then leave the police?


Boko Haram is asking for Sharia in all the Northern states, and the states have Sharia, so what is the problem again?


I have been waiting for this question. I was in detention when it was said that Boko Haram had threatened to turn the entire North of the country into a Sharia state. Since I came out of detention have you heard that Boko Haram is threatening to turn the whole of Nigeria into an Islamic nation? The truth is that those spreading such information are just lying against us. What we are demanding is that those states that have independently declared their states Sharia states should implement it to the letter. Have you seen Sharia cut the hand of someone who steals a cow head, while someone who corruptly enriches himself is left to go free? They have chased away local prostitutes and brought in international red light prostitutes to replace them. They have also banned local alcoholic drinks, yet they drink imported spirits in their respective government houses. Is that Sharia? They are insincere, so they must be effective in the implementation of Sharia. Sharia is being abused. I pity this country. Mauritania does not have any wealth they exported Boko Haram into Nigeria. Now, Libya has money and wealth but have collapsed. Who says that these countries would not bring something worse than Boko Haram into Nigeria?

Sunday, January 15, 2012

FANNING THE EMBERS OF RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE

Little did I expect that the Nigerian northern Muslim elite would go this far in their scheming? When Malam Nasir El-Rufai, the intellectual and politician, said Boko Haram could not have worn jeans; they wear kaftans, I wondered where he was heading. Then a few days later, Dr. Aliyu Tilde, the veterinarian/political scientist/blogger, released his article titled, “Jonathan and the Security of Nigerian Christians”. I was further baffled. Why are the northern Muslim elite suddenly anxious to re-craft the picture created by the nebulous Boko Haram Islamic sect?

When the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) held its so-called peace conference in Kaduna in December 2011 without a proper representation of Middle Belt Christians, one Kaduna-based Barrister Yahaya Mahmood said that until the Government of Plateau State created an Emirate for the Hausa settlers in Jos, that State would see no peace. Shortly after that, Professor Jubril Aminu released his own elderly and intellectual take by calling for the proscription of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN). In his reasoning, if Muslims formed a Muslim Association of Nigeria (MAN), it wouldn’t augur well for peaceful co-existence in the country.

Earlier on in December 2011, Boko Haram gave all southerners and Christians residing in the northern States three weeks within which to relocate or face their wrath. True to their word, when the time allowed expired in the first week of January 2012 they struck on daily basis for 9 consecutive days. Their campaign against Christians actually started on Christmas day with the bombings at St. Theresa’s Catholic Church, Madalla, Suleja, Niger State. They kept up their deadlyl attacks on churches and Christians in Damaturu, Yobe State shortly after President proclaimed a State of Emergency in some Local Governments in four States, Damaturu inclusive. The wanton taking of lives through the use of fire arms and explosives moved to Mubi, Jimeta and Yola in Adamawa State. It is estimated that in the first ten days of this year alone, Boko Haram insurgents have murdered about 115 people, mainly Christians and Policemen.

Tilde in his article tried hard to prove that Boko Haram is actually more linked to Christians than Muslims. He cited the Prof. Jerry Gana and Yakubu Bitiyong cases, which have never been proved, as his evidence. He said Gana has never denied the accusation while Bitiyong was paraded by the SSS as a suspected potential church bomber. Tilde attempted another Christian-Boko Haram link through former Borno State Governor, Modu Sheriff, whom he referred to as a Boko Haram sponsor and an Obasanjo lackey. He said that shortly after Sheriff visited late Boko Haram Leader, Yusuf Mohamed, in a Police cell and spoke to him in Kanuri dialect, he was summarily executed by the Police. He thus insinuated that former Christian President Obasanjo must have remotely masterminded the extra-judicial murder of Yusuf.

Tilde was not done yet. He enumerated how past Muslim Presidents had dealt decisively with similar insurgents in the past whereas Christian President Jonathan, for curious reasons, prefers to keep the crisis on some unclear Christian advantage. Tilde accused CAN leadership of beating the drums of war through their President’s declaration that Christians would defend themselves if Nigeria’s security agents did not do so quickly. CAN leadership should therefore be held responsible for any religious war in the country.

The title of Tilde’s article alone speaks volumes; “President Jonathan and the Security of Nigerian Christians”. It suggests that President Jonathan is a President for Christians alone and so must ensure their security. By extension, Nigerian Muslims have no business with him. Their security must be provided from elsewhere. Could this ‘elsewhere’ be the Boko Haram war chest? I would like readers to note that twice in his article, Tilde referred to northern Muslims as a ‘helpless lot’ thus attesting to their lack of confidence in President Jonathan.

One Aisha Umar-Yusuf reported in the Daily Trust newspaper of September 11, 2011 after the suicide bombing of the UN building in Abuja under the heading, “When is Boko Haram Not Boko Haram?”, as follows; “It is now apparent to discerning Nigerians that certain faceless terror groups are using the Boko Haram tag to perpetrate their evil. We now know for sure that some of the arrests made in connection with bombings or attempted bombings in Northern Nigeria were not of Muslim individuals or groups. Here we call to mind the case of Yakubu Bitiyong of Kaduna, Lydia Joseph, who set St. John’s Cathedral in Bauchi on fire and the three Christian women arrested in connection with the bomb blast at the Mammy market in Bauchi last July. Needless to say, the reach and sophistication of their methods goes beyond the capability of the rag-tag militia left behind by Mohammed Yusuf. But certain orchestrated events led to the present state of insecurity in Nigeria. We must study them to be able to know the forces at work against us.”

Aisha would like to exonerate northern Muslims from any involvement with Boko Haram. Instead, faceless Christians should be suspected because she has been able to name five probable Christians being held as suspects by security agents. Has she cared to find out the religious affiliations of the literarily hundreds of other suspects also in detention for being associated with the activities of Boko Haram? Didn’t she read the Vanguard newspaper report of August 30, 2011 written by one Suzan Edeh saying that Lydia Joseph was a professional prostitute whom the members of the St. John’s Cathedral were trying to convert to Christianity so she could renounce her trade? Was Lydia Joseph’s method really that sophisticated when she attempted to burn the church at 12:30 pm using a gallon on petrol and ordinary matches? Can the remotely detonated and time bombs and suicide missions of late Mohammed Yusuf’s militia really be termed ‘rag-tag’?

Yet another Aisha Yolah has been running a series in the papers with the title, “Theories of Boko Haram – War Mongers”. She came up with 4 theories as to who or what is Boko Haram is. The bottom line is that she wants to dispel the thinking that Boko Haram is a northern Nigerian Muslim thing.

Certain voices from the northern Muslims have also expressed disappointment at their own Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, the CBN Governor, for championing the fuel subsidy removal agenda of the Jonathan administration. I admire the objective, straight-talking and no-nonsense stance of Sanusi on this policy.

Then came the eye-opener via a New York Times article written by Miss Jean Herkovits. Osita Ebiem dissected that article well in his write up titled, “Problem with Nigeria; Still on Jean Jerkovits’ Article in the New York Times”, which was published in elombah.com on January 11, 2012. Ebiem said,

In the past few days some concerted and vigorous efforts are being made by leaders of the Islamic North of Nigeria to change the world's opinion as to what constitutes the truth about the Islamic fundamentalist group, Boko Haram. The campaign statements of these leaders have been so loud such that in just a few days listeners' ears are almost deafened and the air waves so inundated. Now people are beginning to ask why the sudden shift from deafening silence and, on many occasions even egging on the group, to such a high pitched dissociation or differentiation and explaining. What changed? Before now the rest of the world has continued to ask, what does the Northern leaders say about the excessive Islamic killings and other abhorrent activities of the group which the world community has unanimously classified as an Islamic terrorist group based out of Nigeria's North and modeled after the Taliban terrorist cell of the Middle East/Southeast Asia and North Africa.

Now what you are hearing from the Northern leaders is a complete volte-face of what had been and what the people were used to. It is even being reported that Boko Haram is now disclaiming all their former claims in the recent time, such as the Madalla Church and other churches bombing and machine-gunning of Christians across Northern Nigeria. What a smart move. Jean Herskovits and the rest of them are proving to be smart political strategists but in this case they are a little step behind. The cat is already out of the bag. They will need to try harder to sell this ice to the Eskimos. The script they are reading from is simple enough and does not need much sophistication to unravel.

“The script according to Ms. Herskovits and co says to the Muslim North; do not make this battle appear as a fight between Christians and Muslims even though everyone knows that it is. It doesn’t matter, the majority of the people is gullible and will always sincerely believe only what you want them to believe. Even when they see, hear and know a different reality, they will only believe what you tell them to believe especially if the telling is coming from foreign ace pundits and news media. Use reputable foreign media outlets like the New Times and tell the world that Boko Haram of the North of Nigeria is fighting injustice.”

The cat is indeed out of the bag. The impression that Tilde tried to create was thoroughly bashed by the Boko Haram video released on Youtube on Wednesday 11 January, 2012. In the said video, the self-acclaimed new leader of the sect, Imam Abubakar Shekau, said they have declared war on Nigerian Christians without mincing words. He poured vituperations on President Jonathan and CAN President, Ayo Oritsejiofor, personally for their ‘disparaging’ remarks about the sect. Tilde does not to educate anyone anymore as to who is the aggressor or what his grouse is in the current religious pogrom. It is religious cleansing being perpetrated by northern Nigerian Muslims using Boko Haram as an arrowhead.

The northern Muslim elite have decided to embark on a game of political deceit and the illicit conversion of facts. Give cover to Boko Haram subtly while the public is made to believe that Christians are the aggressors with a leadership bereft of ability to manage their own or the country. The question is what is to be gained at the end of the day by such a campaign? We wait to see, that is, if they succeed.

President Godluck Jonathan would be well advised to ‘shine his eyes’ and learn to read between the lines. Nigerian could easily go the way of former Yugoslavia – into 6 new countries. Former President Obasanjo could have saved Nigeria all these troubles if he had checked the first adoption of Sharia jurisprudence in Zanfara State.

John Campbell, a former US ambassador to Nigeria and now senior fellow for African Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, after watching the Imam Shekau video, said on VOA, "But it is important because it fits into the wider picture people have about the government - that it is not working." Campbell has never been an admirer of Jonathan administration anyway.

However, I must acknowledge the fact that Dr. Tilde made a valid point in his article, that President Goodluck Jonathan has not been decisively enough in his handling of the Boko Haram scourge. He has treated the insurgents with kid’s gloves thus far, even to the point of allowing his government to pay the family of the slain leader compensation of N100 Million. Also, admitting publicly that Boko Haram operatives have infiltrated all agencies of his government is a poor strategy and not an excuse. He has left room for all kinds of insinuations and innuendos to be manufactured by whoever cares to. He needs to be ruthless with the insurgents now and save us from further trouble. Nigeria will come out of this a stronger nation.